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ILRReview, 65(3), July 2012. © by Cornell Universit)'. Print 0019-7939/Online 2162-271X/00/6501 §05.00 issues at the workplace level, including recruitment and dismissal, wages and other forms of remuneration, and investments in training. These re forms have not only modified the structure and dynamics of China's econ omy but also profoundly altered the approach of many enterprises to managing labor. This is particularly the case in SOEs in which Western man agement HR practices have been gradually introduced.
To what extent have these economic reforms provided the catalyst for the development of more sophisticated approaches to labor management in China, particularly the diffusion of Western-style human resource (HR) practices? To what extent has the use of these practices improved key estab lishment outcomes such as productivity, labor costs, and efficiency? Alterna tively, to what extent have the intended effects of such practices faced barriers in implementation due to cultural and regulatory constraints? In this article we use data collected from a large sample of Chinese establish ments in 2001 to assess (1) the varying take-up of specific HR practices; and (2) whether the deployment of these HR practices had a significant impact on three key measures of establishment performance: productivity, labor costs, and unit labor costs.
There is now a significant body of work that provides support for the hy pothesis that HR practices can have a significant effect on performance. This work spans a number of industry and national contexts; however, few studies have assessed the extent to which Western-style HR practices have been adopted in Chinese establishments and the strength of the relation ship between such practices and establishment outcomes. Given the enor mous economic reforms that have transformed China's economy over the last 30 years, a unique environment exists in which to assess these questions. Such questions are particularly salient because researchers have faced sev eral challenges in collecting establishment-level data in China that is of high quality and scope.
In this article we use an exceptional data set that allows us to investigate in a more robust manner tbe extent to which Western-style HR practices have been adopted in Chinese workplaces and their effect on a number of establishment outcomes. This is important because the transfer of Western HR practices in China has been generally documented in an anecdotal manner only, and the implications for organizational outcomes have not been well established. Significantly, our data enable us to assess whether the adoption of a range of HR practices has a significant effect on establishment performance (measured as value of sales per employee), labor costs (wage and nonwage labor costs), and unit labor costs.
China's Economic Reforms
The transition to a market economy in China has now extended over more than 30 years. This process has been widely documented by a number of scholars researching China's economic transition (e.g., Qian 2003; Naughton 2007 ). It has consisted of successive waves of reforms and.
in contrast to the shock therapy administered to the c o m m a n d economies of Eastern Europe, the Chinese approach to transition has been a gradualist one (Child and Tse 2001) .
T h e transition process has typically been characterized as consisting of two distinct phases (Naughton 2007) . In the first phase, Chinese policymak ers established a dual-track economic system, which allowed for an increas ing level of market activity alongside the planned economy (Lin, Cai, and Li 1998; Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000) .While this phase enabled a growth in competition in product markets through the formation of town and village enterprises (TVEs), domestic private enterprises (POEs), joint venture en terprises (JVEs) with foreign multinationals, and wholly foreign-owned en terprises (FOEs), the activities of SOEs remained virtually untouched, and the development of competitive labor markets was weak. From the early 1990s, a new wave of reforms was introduced. These reforms were intended to integrate the two systems (or tracks) through the strengthening of mar ket institutions, particularly in the area of labor and capital markets, and by exposing SOEs to greater market competition through restructuring, priva tization, and corporate governance reforms (Qian 2003) .
As a consequence of these reforms, China has experienced a transforma tion in the institutional, technological, and organizational foundations of industry (Naughton 2007) . New industries have been created, and existing ones have u n d e r g o n e major structural reform. These developments have, in turn, been associated with substantial reforms of institutions governing in dustrial relations and labor management at the workplace level (Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002; Shen 2007) . Before discussing these developments, a num ber of salient dimensions of the transition process need to be described.
Diversification of Ownership: FDI, SOE Reforms, and the Expanding Private Sector
A striking feature of the transition process has been the role of FDI and the growing diversity in corporate ownership. The value of FDI into China has grown from an average annual rate of less than 1% of CDP during the 1980s, rising sharply to 6% of GDP in 1994, and falling to around 3% per year since 2005 (Cole, Elliot, andjing 2009) . FDI has provided an important catalyst for China's rapid expansion during this period, as well as promoting the diffusion of technological and organizational innovations, and manage ment capabilities (Naughton 2007) . Since 1979, China has experienced an average annual real growth rate of around 9.5%, representing a sevenfold increase in GDP per capita over that period (Hoffman, Zhao, and Ishihara 2007) .! ' The reliabilit)' of official data on CDP and other aggregate statistics have been widely questioned; see Naughton (2007) for a review. Naughton, for example, suggests that a large part of the explanation for China's rates of growth during this period is the significant underestimation of output during the early reform period. In a detailed assessment of productivity growth over the period 1978 to 1998, Young
Commencing with the Open Door Policy of 1978, restrictions on EDI in Chinese industry were gradually removed. These reforms initially began with the creation of a number of special economic zones (SEZs) designed to attract foreign capital. Over the course of the 1980s, the number of SEZs was expanded and provided the platform for foreign investment in the form of joint venture enterprises and, then, from the 1990s, wholly owned for eign enterprises. By 2003 there were more than 100 SEZs across China .The form that EDI took has also evolved significantly over this period. During the 1980s, various forms of joint ventures between a multinational firm and a domestic Chinese partner represented the typical ownership standard for which foreign investments were made. Since the late 1990s, however, these have been overtaken by foreign investment in the form of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. By 2005, the latter accounted for around two-thirds of all EDIflows into China (Naughton 2007) .
The growing importance of EDI to China's economic capacity was paral leled by reforms to SOEs. These reforms reflected the two phases of transi tion described above. In the first phase, SOEs were largely protected from external product market competition and remained a central part of Chi nese industry. There were, nonetheless, a number of important reforms implemented during this phase to improve efficiency, including (1) the en hancement of the authority of enterprise managers to make resource alloca tion and production decisions; (2) the provision of incentive funds and profit retention schemes to fund enterprise investments, worker welfare provisions, and the payment of bonuses to production workers; and (3) the introduction of incentive mechanisms designed to reward SOE managers for improved performance (Croves et al. 1995) . During the second phase of transition inidated in the mid-1990s, the external protections given to SOEs were removed and corporate law changes, aimed at facilitating corporatiza tion and privatization of SOEs, resulted in a sharp decline in the number of SOEs and their employment levels (Megginson and Netter 2001) . By 2005, most loss-making SOEs had been closed or sold off, while the most profit able ones had been corporatized or privatized {zhuada fangxiao).
The developments described so far contributed to a rapid diversification in ownership of Chinese-based enterprises, as summarized in Eigure 1. This figure reports the number of workers employed by different types of enter prises and shows a dramatic shift in employment away from the state sector to private firms. In 1978, almost 75 million employees were working in SOEs, representing approximately 78% of China's urban workforce (or around 20% of the 401.5 million workers employed across different types of firms in both urban and rural areas). By 2009, however, employment in SOEs had fallen to just over 64 million employees, which represented less than 20% of all urban employment (or around 8.2% of China's 780 million strong (2003) finds that once adjustments are made for rising labor force participation, the shift of labor from agriculture and improvements in educational attainment, labor and total factor productivity growth in the non-agricultural economy rose 2.6% and 1.4% annually. workforce). By contrast, the number of workers classified as self-employed rose from a miniscule 150,000 workers to represent a similar proportion of the workforce (65.9 million workers, or 8.4% of all workers) over the same period. Employment also grew dramatically in TVEs and POEs. Between 1978 and , the proportion of the workforce employed in TVEs had in creased almost threefold, rising from 7.1% of the workforce to just fewer than 20%. In 1978, no private sector firms existed; however, by 2009, this group of firms employed almost 120 million workers (or 15.4% of total em ployment) .
Industrial Relations and HR in China Industrial Relations and Labor Management Practices under the Planned Economy
Under a planned economy, China did not have a competitive labor market (Naughton 2007) . Employment decisions and personnel management {ren shi guanli) within SOEs and COEs were subject to centralized control, ad ministered through detailed and rigid policy guidelines promulgated by the Ministries of Labor and Personnel (Cooke 2005) . Consequendy, labor man agement practices were relatively uniform, irrespective of industry, work place size, or occupation. The state determined employment and wage levels and how workers were recruited. The state also imposed detailed and restrictive personnel guidelines on the management of workers and labor issues, including a system of seniority for promotion and a narrow wage structure across occupations. These guidelines imposed common standards and gave management little capacity to tailor labor management practices to meet workplace needs. For most workers, SOE work units {danwei) played a central role in their lives, providing them with a job for life, a range of welfare entitlements in cluding subsidized housing, education, and healthcare and a retirement pension (Dong and Xu 2008) . Labor management practices were modeled on the "three irons" {jiu santie): the iron rice bowl, the iron chair, and iron wages (Helburn and Shearer 1984) , which provided for centrally planned job allocations, a strongly egalitarian and seniority-based pay structure, and a range of cradle-to-grave welfare and health entidements provided through the enterprise (Zhang etal. 2008) .
The combination of highly centralized employment and wage regulation was associated with an extremely inflexible system of labor management, overstaffing, and inefficient resource allocation, with many SOEs reporting stagnant or negative productivity growth over extended periods of time (Huang and Duncan 1997) . Naughton (2007) , for example, reports that by 1978, quits and dismissals had become virtually nonexistent. A Chinese urban worker was ten times more likely to retire and four times more likely to die on the job than to quit or be dismissed. This inflexibility was reinforced by the regulation of labor mobility through the household registration system, which restricted employment to local areas of residence (Kuruvilla and Erickson2002) .
Reforms to Industrial Relations Institutions after 1978
Reforms to labor market and industrial relations institutions introduced since the adoption of the Open Door Policy have been characterized as having three primary aims (Cooke 2005) : (1) to create a competitive labor market; (2) to restructure work practices in SOEs; and (3), to allow, to a very limited extent, the establishment of workers' organizations. Table 1 summa rizes the major industrial relations regulatory reforms introduced since 1978. As this table shows, the period before the 1990s was characterized by limited activity, v^ith some attempts to build a degree of numerical flexibility into employment decisions of SOEs. In 1978 reforms were introduced to regulate the establishment of "grass-roots" union organization in joint ven tures and, in 1986, changes in the law allowed firms to hire new employees for fixed five-year periods, with no obligation on either the firm or the em ployee to renew the contract after that period (Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002) . Further changes provided SOEs the right to lay off surplus workers (Shen -the termination of employment contracts -employment protection for part-time and seconded workers -open-ended labor contracts -the right of employees to end labor contracts and receive severance rights -New provisions aimed to make arbitration procedures more accessible for workers -Established emplo)'ment growth as a key economic development goal -Regulated the formation of employment agencies, voca tional training, and placement assistance -Expanded prohibitions on workplace discrimination 2007). Nonetheless, it has been generally acknowledged that SOEs re mained largely protected from the reform process during this period (see, for example, Dong and Putterman 2003) .
Beginning with the adoption of a policy aimed at developing a socialist market economy in 1992, a progression of further labor law changes pro vided SOEs (and private sector enterprises) with greater autonomy over em ployment and wage-setting decisions, and removed obligations to provide welfare entidements (Cooney 2007) . These reforms involved a gradual ex tension of the employment contract system, as well as the extension of the rights of union representatives in the workplace and their involvement in the negotiation of collective agreements (Gallagher 2005) .^ In SOEs, this phase involved what were known as the Three Systems re forms (Cooke 2005) , which included the replacement of lifetime employ ment arrangements with fixed-term contracts, the replacement of seniority with greater scope for the introduction of performance-based pay, and the privatization of enterprise-level social welfare arrangements with new wel fare schemes in which workers were required to contribute to pension and other welfare insurance funds (maternity, unemployment, accident and medical) (Naughton 2007) . After 1997, the restructuring of SOEs resulted in large-scale workforce reductions (Appleton et al. 2002) . Taylor and Li (2007) , for example, estimate that between 1998 and 2005, SOEs dismissed approximately 60%of their workforce, or around 30 million employees.
The Diffusion of HR Practices in China
These new market and institutional realities faced by corporatized or priva tized SOEs were also reflected in innovation and evolution in the type of labor management practices utilized by other types of work organizations. Early research examining the types of HR practices deployed in the first generation of JVE arrangements indicated that foreign firms typically adapted to local HR practices (e.g., Helburn and Shearer 1984) ; subsequent studies indicate a gradual shift toward the diffusion of foreign HR practices, including the introduction of formal recruitment procedures, performancerelated pay, and performance management systems (Björkman 2002) .
These trends have to varying degrees been found in both domestic firms and foreign firms. Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002) , for example, observed that during the 1990s inefficient SOEs were typically forced to adopt a cost mini mization and productivity improvement strategy. This has involved the adop tion of low-skilled and low-pay employment arrangements and a reliance on numerical and wage flexibility to remain profitable. Foreign-invested firms have more typically adopted an HR approach based on foreign (home coun try) practices, but often with a blend of processes adapted from traditional Chinese employment arrangements that leads to a hybrid approach in which functional flexibility, quality, and training are given a priority role (Ding and Warner 1999; Björkman et al. 2008) . For example, in a study of 97 foreign firms operating joint ventures in China during the mid-1990s. Lu and Björkman (1997) reported that most had introduced both performance management systems and performance-related pay systems based on home ^Although union rights to play a more pro-active role in the workplace have been extended consider ably since 1992, their ambiguous role as both a party organization and a worker representative remains a major constraint on their capacity to act independently. These constraints are reinforced by the illegal status of strikes and other forms of industrial action (Cooney 2007) . Strikes and protestó are more typi cally initiated by unrecognized groups or more spontaneous actions (Lee 2007 ). There has, over the last few years, been an increasing tolerance for industrial action, and rank-and-file control over grassroots union activities in a growng number of instances. country practices, but had substantially adapted them to the local environ ment. These involved adaptations such as the retention of some elements of seniority in promotion systems, narrow wage differentials, and relatively common performance pay increments across groups of workers.
Overall, the limited evidence indicates a somewhat uneven shift in labor management practices over the period of reform (Cooke 2005) , which ap pears to reflect a number of factors: (1) the inconsistent and unbalanced manner in which regulatory changes have been interpreted and enforced in different provinces across China (Erenkel and Kuruvilla 2002); (2) the per sistence of traditional approaches in corporatized or privatized SOEs (Taylor 2002) ; (3) a lack of understanding in POEs of the needs and conse quences of adopting a more comprehensive approach to managing labor (Cooke 2005) ; and (4) potential incompatibilities between some HR prac tices (such as performance-based pay and large wage differentials) and cul tural values (Yalabik et al. 2008) .
Nonetheless, a growing body of evidence indicates that an increasing number of Chinese firms are developing the HR function and implement ing more sophisticated HR strategies, although distinct differences in the use of HR practices persist between SOEs and domestic and foreign-owned private firms (Cooke 2009 ). In SOEs in particular, remnants of the person nel management practices associated with the planned economy survive: many older workers retain rights of lifetime employment, health care, and enterprise-provided pensions. In the same workplace, younger workers are more typically employed on fixed-term contracts and contribute to public social insurance schemes (Warner 2008) .
HR Practices and Organizational Outcomes in the Chinese Context
The gradual and uneven take-up of HR practices in China is hardly surpris ing and reflects a broad range of factors. As the preceding discussion sug gests, the shift toward a more sophisticated approach to HR has in large part been dictated by the graduated nature of institutional reforms over the last three decades. By the beginning of this century, many of the restrictions placed on both domestic and foreign firms use and implementation of vari ous HR practices had been removed (Naughton 2007) .
Nonetheless, a number of scholars have sought to highlight factors that are likely to constrain whether particular HR practices are deployed (Björkman et al. 2008 ). This literature suggests that a significant relation ship between HR practices and performance may not be evident in the China context for two distinct reasons. Eirst, transition economies such as China present an institutional environment that is significantly different from that found in established market economies (Peng and Heath 1996) . Such an environment often generates a high level of institutional uncer tainty, which is in turn likely to influence the effectiveness of any business strategies firms may seek to deploy, including returns on investments in HR capabilities (Law, Tse, and Zhau 2003) . These differences have implications for domesticfirms-SOEs and private sector enterprises-as well as foreign firms (Child and Tse 2001) . For SOEs or former SOEs, governments may continue to limit their discretion to allocate resources efficientiy. They may also be relatively slow to acquire adequate management capability to oper ate in a market-based environment (Wang, Bruning, and Peng 2007) . For foreign firms not subject to these constraints, transitional institutions may nonetheless inhibit their ability to effectively manage their operations. An aspect of particular concern is the high degree of discretion provided to local officials in the interpretation and application of rules designed to facilitate economic reforms. Such discretion has been associated with cor ruption, appropriation, and other forms of elite opportunism as well as dis crimination against private sector firms (Law et al. 2003; Naughton 2007) . Moreover, where reforms have introduced more market-oriented institu tions, pre-existing political systems may, intentionally or otherwise, continue to exert an ongoing influence on regulatory institutions (Child and Tse 2001; Li etal. 2008) .
Second, a number of researchers have highlighted the potential role of the normative institutional or cultural factors in constraining whether West ern management practices can be effectively transferred to Asian countries (Bae and Lawler 2000; Björkman and Lu 2001; Yalabik et al. 2008 ). Cooke (2005: 116) has observed that HR policies in FOEs and JVEs are "not neces sarily embraced by the employees with enthusiasm." This has been observed across a number of studies (e.g., Easterby-Smith, Malina, and Lu 1995; Huo and Von Glinow 1995; Evans, Pucik, and Barsoux 2002) . In the Chinese con text, particularism in social and business relationships, evident in the role that established networks {guanxi) and status play, may mitigate the effec tiveness of practices based on employee involvement. Similarly, the available evidence suggests that Chinese workers adhere to a strong egalitarian ethic and have not generally accepted significant wage differentials as a form of incentive (Taylor 2002) . Although the use of bonuses and incentive-based pay are widespread, notably after reforms introduced in the mid-1990s, these types of bonuses have been found to be distributed across employees, regardless of their performance (Taylor 2002) .
Cross-cultural research on management practices also provides strong support for the hypothesis that "members of high power-distance societies believe that subordinates should play the role of taking instructions and or ders from their supervisors" (Hui, Au, and Fock 2004: 47) .Consequently, managers operating in these cultural contexts will be less willing to delegate decisions, and employees less willing to exercise discretionary behaviors. A number of studies have found that Chinese employees are more dependent on supervisors and show a higher acceptance of power differences than do employees in Western countries (Giacobbe-Miller et al. 2003; Hui et al. 2004) .
These culturalist arguments have, however, been criticized as being overly static in the way culture is conceptualized (Fang 2006 ) and as providing a weak basis for understanding changing management practices over time (Edwards and Kuruvilla 2005) . T h e extent of economic reforms in the Asian context may generally be associated with shifting cultural norms, which are in turn linked to a more ready acceptance of HR practices (Bae et al. 2003) . Such reforms are likely to be evident in the Chinese context in particular as industry has modernized and internalized Western m a n a g e m e n t influences (Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002) . Ralston et al. (2006) found that work values held by mainland Chinese managers had, over the last 20-year period, tended to converge with the values of managers from H o n g Kong and the United States.
Despite these perplexities, a n u m b e r of studies have begun to investigate the effects that HR practices may have on organizational performance in the Chinese context (Law et al. 2003; Sun, Axyee, and Law 2007; Akhtar, Ding, and Ce 2008; Ngo, Lau, and Foley 2008) .^ A diverse range of mea sures are used in these studies, both in terms of measuring performance outcomes (employee turnover, productivity, perceived profitability, and re turn on equity), and the types of HR practices that are expected to influ ence these outcomes.
In one o f t h e earliest of these studies. Law et al. (2003) examine the rela tionship between the extent to which top m a n a g e m e n t perceive the organi zation's HR approach to be strategic and the firm's performance. Although this study also includes a measure of employees' attitudes toward manage ment, unfortunately, it did not provide any information about variation in HR practices or their consequences for organizational performance. Using a single item measure drawn from Devanna et al.'s (1982) HR index, Ngo et al. (2008) report a study of the effect of HR practices on firm performance in 600 Chinese firms. They find that HR practices have a significant effect on an organization's performance, which was moderated by the employee relations climate. The reliability of their findings is also qualified by their use of subjective measures of financial performance. Similarly, while Aktar et al. (2008) use a well-established instrument to measure HR strategy, their reliance on a measure of performance based on managerial perceptions raises questions about the validity of their findings. Finally, in a piece of re search investigating the HR-performance nexus. Sun et al. (2007) exam ined the relationship between high performance work systems (HPWS), organizational citizenship behaviors, and organizational performance (vol untary turnover and sales per employee) in a small sample (n = 81) of Chi nese hotels located in a single province. Notwithstanding the high quality of the data collected, the authors recognize a n u m b e r of limitations, including the small sample size, the single industry, and single geographic focus of the study, which in turn suggests the need for further research. Note, however.
'A body of work published in Chinese e.xamines different aspects ofthe HR-performance relationship (Zhao 2001; Fan and Björkman 2003; Lui, Zhuo, and Chao 2005; Su, Zeng, and Wright 2007; Qiao, Wang, and Luan 2008) . These studies have typically found no relationship or weak relationships between HR practices and performance. Su et al. (2007) have attributed this in large part to methodological weaknesses of many ofthe sttidies so far tmdertaken in the Chinese context. that none of these studies examine the impact of HR practices on labor costs or unit labor costs.
In short, after more than 30 years of economic and industrial relations reforms in China, we believe there is a need to examine the extent to which Western-style HR practices have been adopted in this country and their ef fects on organizational outcomes. Moreover, China represents a unique ex ample of a transition economy in that the pace and type of institutional, economic, and social reforms in this country have been significantly differ ent from other experiences, typically in Central and Eastern Europe. This need is further reinforced by the fact that available empirical research ex amining the link between HR practices and organizational outcomes is un satisfactory in terms of either sample size or the measures adopted.
Empirical Approach
We report on an analysis of survey data on the adoption of HR practices in a large sample of Chinese establishments and, using a standard production function framework deployed in the HR-performance literature, we seek to assess the impact of HR practices on a number of establishment outcomes in the Chinese context. To do so, we derive measures capturing whether an establishment uses a broad range of HR practices covering non-managerial employees, including training, employment security, nonwage benefits, pay systems, employee involvement, recruitment, and grievance procedures and then assess their impact on sales per employee, a commonly used proxy for organizational performance. Unlike most studies, however, we extend the empirical analysis to examine the effects of HR practices on two other orga nizational outcomes: labor costs and unit labor costs. Even though these outcomes are critical to understanding the true value of HR practices, they are rarely examined simultaneously alongside performance effects-see Cappelli and Neumark (2001) and Way (2002) for exceptions to this obser vation.
Data Description
Data used in this study were obtained from an unpublished survey adminis tered in China by the International Labor Office in 2000 to 2001 as part of its cross-national Enterprise Labor Elexibility and Security (ELES) survey program. The ILO has conducted a number of ELES surveys in developing and transition economies in Asia, the Americas, and Eastern Europe. The ELES surveys consist of a core questionnaire design, which is then adapted to the survey environments in each country. As a result, individual measures based on established labor market and HR-related surveys undertaken in industrialized countries have been adjusted to local conditions so they could be easily understood and answered by respondents (Standing 2003) . In some instances, items were introduced to capture country-specific labor management practices. Eor example, in transition economies such as China, measures relating to the importance of enterprise-based social welfare ben efits, the percentage of employees laid off, and non-producdon sources of income were included.
A sample of 1,024 establishments was selected using a random start with thé probability of being selected based on population proportions accord ing to employment size and sector. The respondent establishments were evenly (approximately) distributed over the 3 regions included in the sur vey (Hangzhou, Zengzhou, and Lanzhou) .'^ Table 2 summarizes the charac teristics of establishments included in the final sample used in the study.
The ELFS survey questionnaires more closely resemble an official census than an academic survey, both in terms of the types of questions asked and in the sense that participation of selected firms was compulsory (Buck et al. 2003) . The China ELFS survey consisted of two parts, administered at differ ent points in time in 2000 and 2001. Both parts were administered by the Academy of Labor and Social Security in the Chinese Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with senior manag ers, usually accompanied by ILO staff. The first part of the survey was com pleted by a financial representative (a firm accountant or financial officer) and contained questions relating to establishment characteristics, the estab lishment's revenue and cost structure, resource allocation, the number and characteristics of employees, wages, and other nonwage labor costs. The second part, which was administered to HR and operational managers, con sisted of questions that asked about a broad range of employment arrange ments, labor management practices, and employee outcomes.
Interviewers and supervisors of the fieldwork were trained using a com mon training manual. Training sessions detailed basic concepts underlying survey questions, items and questions used in the survey, and appropriate interview techniques. This process also led to some rewording of the ques tionnaire to remove potential misunderstanding of terms. Data reliability was enhanced as two or more visits were often undertaken to firms and, in addition, random field checks were made to monitor the interviewers' ac curacy. The design for data collection also had a number of significant fea tures. First, the survey instrument relies on objective data, with no attempt to collect information about management or employee attitudes. Second, the use of multiple informants minimizes the likelihood that the method of data collection is likely to contribute to correlation between variables (com mon method variance), thereby producing an overestimation of the likely effects of HR practices on establishment performance. Third, the use of key informants with appropriate knowledge of the information to be collected provides a greater level of confidence in the quality of the information ••Hangzhou is the capital of the southern province of Zhejiang. Traditionally a center of textile and heavy machine manufacturing, it has developed into a center of electronics and other forms of manufac turing. Zengzhou is the capital of the northern province of Henan and is an area of textile and heavy manufacturing. Lanzhou is the proxdncial capital of Cansu in northwestern China and has emerged as a center of energy production, manufacturing, and resources. collected. Overall, then, the survey process allowed for the collection of de tailed information in a more reliable way than what is often associated with surveys using key informants.
Variables
A review of prior literature suggests that a number of HR practices are typi cally viewed as core to the functioning of an HR system and are likely to in fluence establishment outcomes. While a diverse range of HR practices have been included in previous studies examining the HR-performance rela tionship, most of this research included HR practices that empower non managerial employees by providing greater opportunities to participate in decision-making. For such opportunities of involvement to be effective, HR systems also require the adoption of practices that enhance employee skills and provide adequate motivation for employees to participate and utilize such skills in ways that improve productive efficiency. Opportunities for in volvement may be provided through a great variety of mechanisms, includ ing work teams, total quality management (TQM), and other consultative practices.
The ELFS survey allows us to examine a range of key features of HR sys tems, including training arrangements, aspects of internal employment systems, nonwage benefits, incentive-based pay systems, forms of labormanagement cooperation and other employee voice mechanisms, recruit ment, andfinally, dispute settiement arrangements.
Organizational Outcomes
In this study we included an assessment of HR practices on three organiza tional outcomes: sales per employee, labor costs, and unit labor costs. Sales per Employee (in 2001) provides a proxy for organizational productivity. This has been a commonly used measure in several studies across cognate disci plines such as strategic management, the economics of organization, fi nance and accounting,^ as well as studies seeking to estimate the relationship between HR practices and organizational performance. Sun et al. (2007: 567) suggest that this is an appropriate measure of organizational perfor mance because "it provides a single index that can be used to compare a firm's productivity as well as to estimate the dollar value of returns for investments in employees through high-performance human resource prac tices. This measure of productivity reflects employee efforts that are some what insulated from variations in the capital and product markets."^
•' ' See Richard et al. (2009) for a recent review of the organizational performance literature. ' 'Cappelli and Neumark (2001) have also argued that financial measures, such as profitabilit)', may not be the most appropriate measures to assess performance in multi-establishment firms becausefirms may use different methods for calculating internal measures of plant-level performance, particularly where some production costs may be borne by the firm rather than the establishment.
We are aware that this measure can be problematic, particularly when used in a transition context. In particular, sales per employee can overstate the productivity effect for two main reasons. First, firms may produce more than what is optimal to reduce stock and to sell at a lower margin. This is a particularly sensitive issue in SOEs because managers are under both mar ket and political pressures to perform. Second, the number of employees tends to be higher than what is officially declared, as the informal sector is growing in China, particularly in private enterprises, and employers seek to avoid legal constraints and to avoid paying social security contributions. De spite these limitations, we believe that sales per employee can still provide very useful information in the Chinese context as firms were encouraged by the Ministry of Labor to be as transparent as possible in reporting their re sponses. In the ELFS survey, each establishment was asked to disclose the total value in Chinese Renminbi (RMB) of sales in 1999 and 2000. The mean of these two responses was then divided by the total number of regu lar employees at each establishment to provide an estimate of sales per em ployee.
Labor Costs were captured using two measures: the logged value of the total wages costs per employee and the logged value of nonwage labor costs per employee. The ELFS survey included a question that asked respondents to indicate the total wage costs and nonwage costs for each of the previous two years. In each case the values for the two years were summed and the log of the mean value taken as our measure. Here, nonwage labor costs include allowances for workers, social security contributions, and payments in kind to employees and/or workers (meals, medical expenses, and transport al lowances) .
Unit Labor Costs were estimated following Cappelli and Neumark (2001) , which use the log of the ratio of sales per worker to labor costs per worker (or the log ofthe inverse of unit labor costs).
Training
Employer provided training is measured as the proportion of all employees at the workplace who had received training. Training included both formal and on-the-job training programs run by the establishment. The survey ac tually asked respondents to indicate the number of employees who received training in 1999 and 2000. In each case the response was divided by the number of employees and the estimate was computed as the average over these two years.
Regular Workers
Employment stability in the form of regular employment provides workers with incentives to invest in firm-specific skills and to encourage discretion ary effort (Wu and Chaturvedi 2009) . The survey asked respondents to spec ify the number of employees belonging to the following work statuses: regular full-time, regular part-time, temporary or casual, contract workers, trainees or apprentices. To best capture the proportion of workers who en joyed stable employment, we calculated the proportion of the total work force that was employed as regular employees.
Benefits
The presence of various nonwage benefits schemes provides means to elicit greater commitment from employees to their organization (Haines, Jalette, and Larose 2010) . This is particularly important in China, where a broad range of nonwage benefits were common, especially in SOEs. The survey asked respondents whether eight employee benefits were provided by the employer: paid leave, paid sick leave, holiday/recreation facilities, sickness benefits, subsidized housing, childcare, pension/retirement benefits, and subsidized transport services. Avalué of 0 was assigned for each benefit that was not available, and a value of 1 was coded if the benefit was provided by the employer. The scores for individual benefits were summed to obtain an overall score.
Incentive-Based Pay
Within the HR literature, incentive-based pay arrangements have generally been viewed as an important complement to both investments in employee skills and different forms of employee involvement. Studies have also found that variable pay schemes may contribute to performance by reducing labor turnover (Haines et al. 2010 ). The survey asked three questions, which we used to capture the use of incentive pay systems. The first question asked whether the establishment operated a profit-related pay system for employ ees (No = 0, Yes = 1 ). The second question asked whether the establishment operated any incentive scheme for individual employees, such as bonus schemes (No = 0, Yes = 1). The third question asked respondents to indicate whether the establishment had introduced any other income-related bene fit scheme, such as skilled-based pay (No = 0, Yes = 1). These three measures were first entered as individual items, and then in a separate regression as a composite variable, consisting of the sum of responses to these three items.
Eabor-Management Cooperation
Central to most studies examining the effects of HR practices on establish ment outcomes has been the extent to which employees are provided with opportunities for involvement in decision-making. Typically, researchers have been interested in the role of self-managed or autonomous work teams in eliciting discretionary effort and increased productivity. Unfortunately, our survey did not include any questions relating to work teams; however, the questionnaire did ask respondents whether participation-enhancing work practices were employed: quality circles, joint consultation arrangements to discuss work and production related issues, and other. Responses to these three items were coded as dichotomous variables (No = 0, Yes = 1). Quality circle and joint consultation items were entered as individual items and then in a separate regression as a composite measure consisting of the sum of responses to the three items.
Occupational Health and Safety Committee
The survey asked respondents to indicate whether the establishment had a committee or department to maintain the safety of workers at the work place. Responses included: 1 = "Yes, a safety committee"; 2 = "Yes, a safety department"; 3 = 'Yes, both a safety committee and a safety department"; or 4 = "No". These responses were re-coded to either Yes (= 1) or No (= 0) to generate a dichotomous variable.
Recruitment
Measures capturing various recruitment practices were also included in our study. The intention was to assess how such practices might influence the quality of employees. More robust recruitment practices are also expected to result in better quality matches between the firm and its employees and to reduce employee turnover. The survey asked respondents to indicate the main method used for recruiting production and shop floor workers. Re sponses were categorized as recruitment through advertising, direct recruit ment, recruitment through educational institutions, informal recruitment through relatives and friends, and other. Each category was coded as a di chotomous variable (No = 0, Yes =1).
Probation
The use of probationary periods may enhance performance for two reasons (Loh 1994) . First, probation periods provide an employer with information that may not be available at the time of recruitment. Second, probation has also been found to discourage less-qualified workers from applying for jobs. The survey asked respondents to indicate whether the establishment usually hired new employees on a probationary basis (No = 0, Yes = 1).
Formal Dispute Settlement Procedure
The final HR practice we include is a measure of whether the establishment has a formal dispute resolution procedure. Such procedures are generally viewed as an important mechanism that allows dissatisfied employees to voice their grievance rather than exit. Properly functioning dispute mecha nisms are expected to improve employee perceptions of organizational jus tice (Haines et al. 2010 ). This in turn is viewed as a key means through which HR practices are likely to have positive performance effects (Wu and Chaturvedi 2009) . O u r survey asked the question: "How are labor disputes setüed in the establishment?" Respondents were asked to indicate whether disputes were setded through a voluntary dispute setflement procedure, through a Labor Dispute Court, or some other arrangement. O u r interest was in understanding establishment-level HR practices. We therefore recoded responses to equal 1 if disputes were settled using an establishmentlevel voluntary dispute settlement procedure, and to equal 0 for all other responses.
Gontrol Variables
A key concern among many researchers has been to identify potential biases introduced by missing variables (e.g., Bartel 2004), some of which reflect differences in industr)' environments (Datta, Cuthrie, and Wright 2005) . To ensure these types of factors are accounted for, our analysis includes the fol lowing control variables: union presence (No = 0, Yes = 1), logged value of establishment age, dummy variables capturing different ownership types, and industry and regional dummy variables. Union presence is included to ensure any union effects are captured. While it is commonly believed that the dependency of Chinese unions on the state means they are unlikely to function independendy of management, recent evidence suggests they may nonetheless play an important role in influencing establishment level out comes (Ce 2007) . The other controls are intended to capture differences such as industry dynamism, entrenched management styles and systems, and regional differences, which may also affect the potential returns on in vestments of HR practices. This is perhaps particularly significant in the context of transition economies in which regional differences in regulatory arrangements and enforcement may substantially impact on firm perfor mance (Child and Tse 2001; Law et al. 2003) . In the case of industry dum mies, establishments were originally categorized in the survey as one of 23 industry categories. As Table 2 indicates, the sample for some industry groups was extremely small, making it impossible to rely on these as sepa rate variables. When this was the case, these dummies were dropped from our estimation. Of the 23 industry categories identified in the survey, 12 categories (indicated in Table 2 ) were used as control variables. Einally, dummy variables were created for each of the regions in which establish ments were located. Table 3 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations for all vari ables except the industry and region dummies. The correlations among variables were typically low, with a number of unsurprising exceptions. The capital inputs (r= .679, p < 0.01) and number of employees (r= .540, p < 0.01) were strongly correlated with sales per employee. The log value of capital was also highly correlated with the log number of employees (r = .651, p < 0.01). Correlations among HR practice variables were generally low, indicating our results are unlikely to suff'er from multicoUinearity. Cenerally, HR practices were positively associated with establishment performance. •'The table reports the proportion of all firms (n= 1,024) within each type that has adopted each of the included HR practices. Percentages withñn groups may not add to 100.0 due to rounding. ''SOE: State-owned enterprise; POE: Privately owned enterprise; FOE: Foreign-owned enterprise; JVE: Joint venture enterprise.
•^The benefits index was the sum of eight dummy variables that captured whether an establishment pro vided any of the following eight benefits: paid leave, paid sick leave, holiday/recreation facilities, sickness benefits, subsidized housing, childcare, pension/retirement benefits, and subsidized transport sendees.
although the informal recruitment variable was negatively associated with sales per employee.
Corporate Ownership and the Adoption of HR Practices
We first present descriptive statistics on the adoption of different HR prac tices across types of firms. Table 4 reports the take-up of each of the HR practices described above. As this table shows, the adoption of different types of practices differed significandy across types of firms. Domestic POEs tended to employ a smaller proportion of their total workforce as regular employees than did other types of firms. While the overwhelming majority of establishments reported that less than 20% of their workforce received training, a significantly higher than expected proportion of JVE firms-14% compared with 6.8% for the entire sample-reported that they provided training for more than half of their employees. The Benefits Index cap tured a range of entitlements typically associated with the social welfare functions of the danwei The enduring nature of these practices is evident particularly among SOEs, which reported significantly higher levels of pro vision of each of the eight benefits, as well as being more likely to provide a relatively higher number of these. This compares with a tendency among FOEs and domestic POEs to provide none or a small number of these ben efits. Interestingly, JVEs show a pattern of benefit provisions more closely related to SOEs than to private sector firms. There are also significant differences in the type of incentives provided to workers. Domestic firms-state-owned and privately owned firms-show a significantly higher propensity to utilize profit-based incentive schemes than do foreign firms or JVEs. Indeed FOEs show a significantly lower pro pensity to use any form of incentive pay arrangements compared with other types of firms. This difference is particularly evident in the proportion of FOEs utilizing individual forms of incentive pay (37.5% of firms, compared with 52.5% of all firms).
Although few Chinese establishments reported having instituted quality circles (3.6% of all firms), a significantly higher proportion of FOEs (4.8%) and JVEs (4.7%) report this practice than either SOEs (2.5%) or domestic POEs (3.2%) .Joint consultative committees were more widely used, although our data suggest that by 2001, less than 10% of establishments had such ar rangements in place. Again, SOEs were far less likely to report consultative committees than did other types of firms. In contrast to either quality circles or joint consultative committees, a far larger proportion of establishments reported having an OH&S committee in place. Unlike the other forms of labor management consultation, OH&S committees were more prevalent in SOEs than other types of establishments. Privately owned and FOEs show a significantly lower propensity to institute OH&S committees than either SOEs or JVEs. Table 3 shows that the most widely used method of hiring is direct recruit ment; that is, directly hiring employees at the establishment door, without advertising or using an external agency. This practice was most common in POEs and JVEs, although a significantly higher proportion of POEs (19.6%) and JVEs (27.1%) also reported utilizing advertising as a way of attracting potential employees, compared with SOEs (6.2%) and FOEs (7.7%). Inter estingly, a similar pattern is evident in relation to the use of probation peri ods. Those firms who reported the use of advertising in recruitment were also significantly more likely to report using a probationary period as part of their recruitment decisions.
Finally, a significantly higher proportion of private sector firms-both domestically and foreign-owned establishments-reported having a formal dispute resolution process compared with either SOEs or JVEs. Again, this may reflect traditional systems within SOEs, which relied on management dominated "grass roots" (i.e., workplace) unions to manage grievances (Liu 2010) .
HR Practices and Organizational Outcomes
How have these practices influenced establishment outcomes in the Chi nese context? Our data enable us to assess whether these practices are asso ciated with three important indicators of firm performance: sales per employee, labor costs, and unit labor costs. Most studies have generally fo cused on examining the impact of HR practices on measures of productivity or financial performance, but few studies have attempted to assess the im pacts of these practices on labor costs and the cost of producing each unit of output. Moreover, Cappelli and Neumark suggest that these three variables "can be interpreted in terms of what matters most to different parties" (2001: 753) . Employers have an obvious interest in productivity and unit labor costs as a measure of efficiency, while employees will (all else being equal) be better off where wage and nonwage expenditures are higher.'
Sales per Employee
Eollowing previous studies examining the HR-performance relationship (e.g.. Black and Lynch 2001; Bartel 2004) , we base our empirical estimation on an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function containing the value of sales (F), labor (L), capital {K), and HR practice variables. A persistent problem identified in the research is the omission of relevant variables, thereby introducing biases in the estimate of the true relationship between HR practices and establishment performance (Cerhart et al. 2000) . Using a more structured production function has the advantage of including base inputs of an establishment's production systems that have been excluded from many estimations of the relationship between HR practices and firm performance.^ 'The strength of this ceteris paribus assumption has been questioned by some research. Black, Lynch, and Krivelyova (2004) show that the costs of implementing high performance work practices may be unevenly distributed across the workforce, through higher wage inequality and employment reductions.
Similarly Codard (2001) shows that while alternative work practices have positive effects at a "moderate" level of adoption, such practices are also associated with negative employee outcomes when used more intensively.
^h e production function used to estimate the effects of HPWS adopts a standard constant returns to scale function Q=aLí9O, where Qis some measure of output, K\s capital stock, and Z. is a measure of labor inputs. This form has been the one typically used in studies adopting a production function estimation framework. Black and Lynch (2001) test alternative specifications but find no significant differences in coefficients on capital and labor inputs or HR practices. In this framework, our measure of Z, is effectively augmented by introducing variables to capture the impact of HR practices in transforming a "raw" estimate of ¿into effective labor (Bartel 2004 ). Here we estimate the following regression:faY-a+ ß/nKj + ylnL; + 5'HR^ + ri'CONTROLS + e¡, where ZraY¡ is the log of sales, ZnKj is the log of the value of capital. Table 5 presents regression results for the effects of HR practices on es tablishment performance. Here three models are presented. Model 1 pre sents results for a baseline regression in which control variables, establishment characteristics, and type of ownership variables were included. These vari ables accounted for 58.7% of the variance in the log value of sales. Union
Inhi is the log of the number of employees, 5' is a vector of coefficients on HRj which are establishmentlevel measures of HR practices, T)' is a vector of coefficients on the control variables that capture establishment characteristics, and e¡ is an error term.
presence, the value of capital, and the number of employees were all strongly significant. Of the three ownership types included in the regression, SOEs was the only type significant, indicating that in comparison with domestic POEs, these establishments were less productive. The coefficients on both the COEs and FOEs/JVEs were not significant. Models 2 and 3 then include HR practice variables in the regression. In Model 2, only composite forms of each variable are introduced, while Model 3 includes the 15 individual HR practice variables. In Model 2, three of the composite HR variables were significant: training, recruitment, and formal dispute settiement procedure. While the training and recruitment variables were found to have a positive effect on sales per employee, the coefficient on the formal dispute setdement procedure variable was negative. In Model 3, however, only the training variable remains significant once all variables are included. Overall, the results show limited support for the hypothesis that individual HR practices have a significant impact on performance among our sample of Chinese establishments. Our results do, however, sup port the proposition that investments in employee quality and skills are sig nificantiy associated with establishment level performance. This is an issue we return to in the following section.
HR Practices and Labor Costs
To what extent do the effects of HR practices on productivity translate into net positive effects on establishment performance? In order to begin to ad dress this issue, we seek to first assess the effect of HR practices on labor costs. In a longitudinal study of U.S. manufacturing establishments, Cap pelli and Neumark (2001) found evidence to support the proposition that the use of HR practices, linked to high performance work systems, were as sociated with a transfer of power to workers and, consequently, an increase in compensation. The effect on labor costs, they suggest, largely offsets the modest productivity gains associated with high performance work practices.
To assess this proposition we regress two measures of labor costs-the log value of the total wages costs per employee, and the log value of nonwage labor costs per employee-on the same explanatory variables used to assess the impact of HR practices on establishment performance. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6 .
Eew HR variables were found to have a substantial impact on wage costs. To begin with, it is worth noting that wage costs appear to bear some rela tionship to firm type with COEs reporting significantly lower wage costs than POEs. Turning to the HR practice variables, the range of nonwage benefits provided to employees was associated with lower wage costs per employee, suggesting establishments are able to use such benefits as an alternative to cash wage payments. This practice has been most closely associated with SOEs and former SOEs in China and other transition economies (Naughton 2007) . The relationship between wage costs and the use of individual schemes, such as bonuses, was positive and highly significant. Recruitment through educational institutions was also associated with significantly higher wage costs per worker, perhaps reflecting a greater use of highly skilled workers.^ A number of significant effects were also evident in relation to nonwage labor costs. In particular, the presence of an occupational health and safety committee, and recruitment through public advertising, were associated with higher levels of nonwage labor costs. By contrast, a reliance on direct recruitment and informal recruitment methods were both associated with lower levels of nonwage labor costs. ' To assess this, we computed two separate measures of the proportion of skilled workers employed by the establishment (for all employees and for production workers only). Both of these variables were sig nificantly correlated with the use of recruitment through education institutions (p< 0.05). Table 7 reports OLS regression results for unit labor costs. Following Cap pelli and Neumark (2001) we constructed a measure of unit labor costs as the ratio of sales per employee and total labor costs per employee.
HR Practices and Unit Labor Costs
Here our results raise some questions about the impact of HR practices on the overall efficiency of production in the Chinese context. A number of specific HR practices were associated with significant reductions in unit labor costs, notably: individual incentive schemes, recruitment through ed ucation institutions, and the presence of a formal dispute settlement proce dure. The individual incentive variable is of particular interest to us because it was associated with significantly higher labor costs per employee. The negative sign on the coefficient for this variable suggests that these addi tional costs were offset by improvements in production efficiency. The re duction in unit labor costs associated with relying on educational institutions to recruit labor is perhaps not surprising. As opposed to less formal forms of recruitment, this approach may provide an important device for assessing quality as well as recruiting specialist skills. The negative relationship be tween the adoption of a formal dispute setdement procedure and unit labor costs is also of considerable interest, particularly in the Chinese context where unions are generally viewed as dependent on management and un likely to provide an effective voice mechanism for worker interests.
A number of HR variables were associated with higher unit labor costs. Most significandy, unit labor costs proved higher in establishments where a greater proportion of employees were engaged in training, suggesting that the return on these investments is not evident in the immediate period in which the cost is accrued. The uncertainty and often longer nature of re turns on human capital investments has been highlighted as one explana tion for the relatively low diffusion of high performance work practices (Erickson and Jacoby 2003) . This might pose particular challenges in the Chinese context where product market and regulatory uncertainty are likely to influence the expected returns on such investments in future periods, particularly where reforms that induce higher levels of labor mobility have been introduced (Child and Tse 2001) .
Recruitment through educational institutions was associated with lower unit labor costs, whereas recruitment using informal or direct methods was associated with high unit labor costs. While these methods can be used at a lower cost (as our results indicated), they may be associated with lower qual ity labor, or may require firms to make larger investments upfront in on-the job training, which in turn, reduced workers' productivity.
Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical literature examining the relationship between HR practices and workplace performance has proved highly influential in the industrial relations and HR research in developed countries, with only limited atten tion being placed on researching the nature of these interactions in diverse institutional and cultural environments. China presents an interesting set ting to test some of these well-established propositions for several reasons. Eirst and foremost, it has, over the course of the last thirty years, become a major economic power in the global economy, accounting for a growing proportion of world production and trade. Second, over the same period it has sought to gradually establish market institutions, including a properly functioning labor market and private ownership. The impact of this transi tion has been of considerable interest to researchers in a number of fields. One salient reason for this interest is to understand how institutional con straints and uncertainty may influence business strategies and the diffusion of Western business and management practices among domestic firms and joint ventures (Wei and Lau 2008) . Third, it presents a contrasting cultural environment in which Western management practices may not prove as ef fective as in their original setting.
This study aimed to contribute to understanding how the enormous eco nomic transformation that has been taking place in China over the last three decades has influenced the adoption of Western-style HR practices and how these practices have shaped organizational outcomes including firm performance.
Admittedly, the ILO ELFS data are unlikely to accurately reflect current HR practice-there have been further economic reforms and change over the last decade, all of which are likely to have had some consequences for the pattern of diffusion and take-up of HR in the period following the ad ministration of the ELFS survey. Nevertheless, the data we use provide some valuable insights for a number of reasons. First, HR research in China is still, to a large extent, characterized by an absence of bigb-quality data (Zhang and Lamond 2009) . As previously noted, ELFS surveys are one of the few exceptions and have not previously been used to explore tbese issues. Sec ond, our review of the developments in China emphasized the industrial relations and labor market reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, the period immediately preceding the collection of our data. This provided a unique opportunity to systematically assess the diffusion of various practices during this time frame. It should also be emphasized that the 1990s were particu larly important years for Chinese HR and industrial relations in that an ex tensive overhaul of labor law provisions occurred, and the liquidation of inefficient SOEs was, to a large extent, completed by the turn of the century. This, coupled with the extensive discretion granted in the early 1990s to JVEs and private domestic and foreign enterprises to establish their man agement practices, render the 1978 to 2000 period a salient testing ground. Third, the data provide a rare opportunity to assess the validity of the propo sition that HR practices are likely to be associated with higher levels of firm performance in a transitional institutional and cultural context. Finally, we also believe that this study makes an important contribution to the more general HR-performance literature as it is one of the few examples assessing the effects of these practices on firm performance, costs, and productive ef ficiency (unit labor costs) simultaneously.
The ELFS data suggest that by the end of the twentieth century, many Western HR practices had diffused widely across all types of firms, although to varying degrees. Of particular interest are HR practices within SOEs. Here, the data reveal that the adoption of new HR practices was often pres ent alongside older, more traditional, models. Some of the newer HR prac tices, such as profit-based pay and individual incentives, were introduced as part of the reforms made during the late 1990s that were intended to raise productivity and efficiency. Similarly, while SOEs were more likely to employ workers on regular contracts, the data reveal a substantial proportion of workers in all firm types were employed on fixed-term contracts or on a part-time basis. Yet, these new practices were more prevalent in private sector firms or j o i n t venture arrangements. In the case of some practices, such as quality circles and j o i n t consultative committees, these practices were absent in the overwhelming majority of establishments irrespective of whether they were part of a domestic or international enterprise, and whether privately or publicly owned. In short, the data provide a picture of a diffuse yet uneven take-up of Western-style practices, which very often co existed with traditional models. A typical example of this blend was the ex tensive use of nonwage benefits in both SOEs and JVEs.
T h e analysis we presented in relation to the effects of such practices on organizational outcomes seems to suggest that few individual practices have strong effects on establishment performance in the Chinese context. T h e most consistent result across the different models presented here is that the proportion of employees participating in either on-the-job or formal train ing programs was associated with higher performance, measured as sales per employee. It should be emphasized that we have not tested for possible interactions among HR practices to assess the extent of "bundling" or com plementarities between practices. Nor did we assess, for example, whether such practices had more significant effects in certain industries or types of establishments.
More significantiy, a n u m b e r of HR practices were found to be associated with higher labor costs. O u r analysis indicated that these cost effects appear to reflect the relationship between the investments in skill and labor costs. These results were broadly consistent with the findings of Cappelli and Neu mark (2001) and Way (2002) . Cappelli and Neumark suggest that this was largely a consequence of the fact that high-performance work practices in volve a transfer of power from m a n a g e m e n t to employees, which also al lowed employees to capture the additional productivity associated with HR practices in the form of higher wages. O u r results provide qualified support for this view. In particular, H R practices seem to influence the cost structure of production through increasing nonwage labor costs in the form of addi tional investments in skills in the process of establishing practices designed to facilitate employee involvement and incentive schemes intended to in duce discretionary effort.
Although our results suggest the relationship between HR practices and labor costs is more complicated than what was originally proposed by Cap pelli and Neumark, our overall conclusion in relation to the net efficiency effects of HR practices is somewhat similar. While investments in HR prac tices may have some positive effects on productivity, the net gains are at best slight, if at all positive, once cost effects are offset against productivity gains. O n e result that is of particular interest is the negative relationship we found between the adoption of a formal dispute procedure and unit labor cost. This would suggest that where present these processes appear to operate ef fectively. Although Chinese unions are generally viewed as being ineffective in representing worker interests (Friedman and Lee 2010) , this result raises the possibility that unions may play some positive role in workplace dispute resolution (Ge 2007). In interpreting our results, keep in mind the limitations of our study. The original survey was not designed to measure the effects of HR practices on firm performance. As with any data set that was created for purposes other than its current use, we were limited in the selection of our HR variables by the items that were available in the original ELES survey. This in turn cre ated problems as some potentially relevant variables were missing. Eor ex ample, the effect of self-managed or autonomous work teams, an important variable for both the HR and "high performance work systems" literature on performance and labor costs, could not be measured. Significandy, and as we have already noted, the ELES survey is a cross-sectional data set that has only limited value in explaining causal relationships over time.
Despite these limitations our findings have several strengths and make a significant contribution to the HR-performance debate. Eirst, by using ob jective measures and by having multiple respondents answer different ques tions we were able to avoid common method variance problems. Second, as previously noted, the sample is considerably larger than in most other re search examining HR practices in China. Third, the data set is across indus tries and regions thus allowing us to test the importance of variation across production contexts while controlling for several key variables.
